tograph taken on a rooftop across the river from New York City in 1903 in which Western artist Charles Schreyvogel stands at his easel painting, using a live model, a fully adorned United States cavalryman caught in the act of shooting an Indian some 2000 miles and 40 years distant.
"The West as America" documents a rather important sort of geographical fantasy and projection and uncovers in the process the grizzly repression involved in the great westward pioneer expansion. Not surprisingly, its unflinching account of the brutality of the frontier-a space that, like the frontier experience for the South African Afrikaaner community, has been ideologically formative in the construction of a particular national identity-did not lie well with the jingoistic and nationalist sentiments rampant on the Hill. Senator Ted Stevens (Republican, Alaska), who naturally had not seen the show, declared it "perverse" and generally unfit for human consumption; Senators Simpson and Gorton were respectively "shocked" and "appalled." Only in the land of the free, opined the Wall Street Journal, is it possible to mount an entirely hostile assault on the nation's founding and history, "to re-cast that history in the most distorted of terms and have the taxpayer foot the bill" (cited in Walker 1990:25). Left-leaning perversion creeps the hallowed halls of the national museum. In the name of public decency, historical veracity, and pioneer goodwill, senators are threatening budgetary retaliation against the Smithsonian complex. The public is flocking to the show, of course, and according to Museum Director Elizabeth Broun, people stand in line to write "whole pages" in the comment books. ' A little after the opening of "The West as America," Robert Schenkkan's extraordinary nine-part play, The Kentucky Cycle (1989) , premiered at the Intiman Theatre in Seattle. The cycle spans 200 years of eastern Kentucky history, from the Indian wars of the 1770s to settlement and land speculation to the invasion of mining capital and, finally, to the war on poverty in the 1970s. Appalachia was, in a sense, America'sfirst frontier, but, unlike the West, which is only now subject to a serious revisionist history, it is much more closely affiliated with what dramaturg Tom Bryant (cited in Intiman Theatre Company 1991) calls the precise collision between the dark history of the region and our most cherished national myths. Harry Caudill (1960) , one of the oldest defenders of Appalachia, led the struggle in documenting the exploitative configuration of nonlocal mine capital and local politics that produced an enduring regional economic backwardness, underdevelopment, and poverty. Appalachian frontier capitalism simultaneously created, some might say invented, a distinctive regional culture-mountain crafts, hillbillies, and mission schools-"all that is native and fine," to employ David Whisnant's (1983) lovely adage. But, all in all, not a pretty story: struggle, naked power, and violence encapsulating an extractive economy of the most rapacious sort. The tragedy of the Cumberlands is how Harry Caudill described it. Yet scarcely a murmur here; the stuff of Matewan is, after all, only a minor blemish on the great screen of American popular consciousness.
Frontiers are, of course, particular sorts of spaces-symbolically, ideologically, and materially. They represent the first wave of modernity to break on the shores of an uncharted heartland. As the cutting edge of state-sponsored forms of accumulation, frontiers are characteristically savage, primitive, and unregulated. At the margins of state power, they create their own territorial form of law and (dis)order. One thinks in the contemporary epoch of Amazonia, a frontier declared fair game in the 1960s by the Brazilian military junta in the name of national security and border consolidation (against communist infiltration). It subsequently became the site of Indian genocide, wild land speculation, John Wayne shoot-outs between ranchers and colonists (remember Chico Mendes?), and unimaginably barbaric work conditions documented in Sebastiao Salgado's harrowing, Bosch-like photographs of Serra Pelada gold miners (1990) . But frontiers are also locally encoded in symbolic terms, and often carry a powerful ideological valency, particularly when national identity itself is seen to derive from "frontier stock," or if economic potential ("development") is seen to be wedded to the opening of the frontier.
It is in this sense that "The West as America" exhibition brushes history against the grain (the language is Walter Benjamin's). The West possesses a visceral, mythological power and hence its unraveling touched the raw nerve of postVietnam United States patriotism, speaking directly to contemporary debates and struggles over what it means to be American-indeed what America is and how it was made. To reveal that Frederick Remington's classic canvas Fight for the Water Hole is a metaphor for the plight of embattled capitalists in an era of strikes and immigration, and hence derived from the multicultural urban milieu in which he lived, is not only to show that artists are susceptible to various social and historical forces but also that art-spatial representations in this case-can help construct, and legitimate, nation building.
At certain historic junctures and sites, these sorts of insights are capable of generating much heat (if not necessarily light). For example, "The West as America" show arrived in Washington, D.C., during a period of intense politicization of university and high school curricula, during the high tide of multiculturalism, and not least, amidst a furor over something called "political correctness," a condition that apparently represents the hegemony of aging 1960s radicals on American campuses who actually prevent debate in the name of political rectitude. As a consequence, 164 images depicting the space of the Western frontier becomes, for conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer, a wholesale trashing of national history, indeed nothing less than, God forbid, "the most PC exhibit in U.S. history." Space as a neutral, passive container, indeed! As Gupta and Ferguson (this issue) note in their introduction, there has been a growing interest in theorizing space over the last two decades, and the spatial lexicon (border, territory, place, mobility) is now part and parcel of debates within social theory and postmodernism. It was Foucault (1972) who noted the organic connection between spatial concepts and the micro-physics of powerthe relation between surveillance and the map, for example-and recognized that all territorial concepts imply the exercise of power (cf. Sack 1986). Space for Foucault was a specific sort of site, a container of power, and hence the means by which subjects came to be incarcerated, disciplined, and imprisoned within spaces of social control (see Harvey 1989:211 (1984) admonition that all of the social sciences must make room for a geographical conception of mankind.2 Ed Soja (1989) has rightly observed that this resurgence of space and spatiality stands, ironically, as a reaction to the previous subordination of space in social theory generally, to a privileging of history over geography. However, a growing concern with context and a belated recognition that local socialization is central to the constitution of society has meant that societies must now be seen as constituted in time and space. Social structures cannot be separated from spatial structures (Gregory and Urry 1985) ; as Thrift says, "Social structures are geographies-overlapping, partially integrated and messy geographies-and they have to be not just perceived but theorised and even represented as such" (1989: 263, emphasis added).
To situate some of the articles in this issue, and some of the issues raised by them, I want to root identity and difference in the substantial geographical literature on space, place, and locality. An appropriate starting point is David Harvey's (1989:22) grid of spatial practices (see Figure 1) , which he adapts from Henri Lefebvre's discussion of spatial experience, perception, and imagination. As Harvey makes clear, this triad is, in quite complex ways, related internally and dialectically. Particular representations (for example, of the United States Western frontier) emerge from specific material spatial practices and from certain forms of domination and control of space, yet they can become material forces in their own right, a sort of spatial habitus to appropriate Bourdieu's language (Bourdieu 1977; cf. Moore 1986). These dimensions of the material (flows, patterns, movement), representational (spatial signs, codes, and maps), and the imaginary dimensions of space can be, as it were, refined along certain axes of spatiality: access/distanciation, appropriation/use, domination/control, and social production. Without rehearsing a long and somewhat tedious history of spatial analysis (see Entrikin 1991 and Soja 1989 for good reviews), I think it is fair to say that the strongest geographical suit has been in material spatial practices, what Peet and Thrift have called the political economy approach in human geography (1989: 3), documenting the uneven development of capitalism, the social production of spaces and regions, the changing spatial divisions of labor, and the means by which spaces (for example, the city) are appropriated (e.g., gentrification), controlled, and regulated. There has been, admittedly, a long-standing (but intellectually rather shallow) concern with environmental perception, cognitive mapping, and the symbolism of particular places and landscapes (see Meinig 1979 ), but it is in the realm of representation, and correlatively of spatial experience and meaning, that geography has been at its weakest. In this regard, it is rather apposite that the "new wave" of regional and place-based geographies explicitly calls for ethnography (Sayer 1989) , and for an engagement with cultural theory, iconography, and textual analysis (Daniels 1989; Jackson 1989) .
I want to identify four broad areas of geographical inspection-(a) the social production of space, (b) the new regionalism, (c) locality, globality, and modernity, and (d) landscapes as ways of seeing or maps of meaning-that intersect with oretical linkages between space and capitalism quite brilliantly, and he is worth quoting at length.
Capitalism also "encounters barriers with its own nature," which force it to produce new forms of geographical differentiation. The different forms of geographical mobility [e.g., capital, labor power ...] ... interact in the context of accumulation and so build, fragment and carve out of spatial configurations in the distribution of productive forces similar differentiations in social relations, institutional arrangements and so on. In so doing capitalism frequently supports the creation of new distinctions in old guises. ... It is important to recognise, then, that the territorial and regional coherence that . is at least partially discernible within capitalism is actively produced rather than passively received as a concession to "nature" or history .... The upshot is that the development of the space economy of capitalism is beset by counterposed and contradictory tendencies. On the one hand spatial barriers and regional distinctions must be broken down. Yet the means to achieve that end entail the production of new geographical differentiations which form new spatial barriers.... [1985:11] A particular regime of capitalist accumulation produces a particular landscape whose very fixity becomes a barrier to be overcome in the next wave Scott 1988:176) . Viewing the region, or the city for that matter, as "a historically contingent process" (the language is from geographer Allan Pred [1984] ), permits one not only to locate, say, Appalachia on the larger canvas of American capitalism but also to see how it was, in the process, culturally invented.
The industrial restructuring debate,3 both in the United States and Britain, also generated a substantial literature on how local economies required both a place-or a site-specific analysis and a grasp of the ways in which they are subject to wider economic processes (Cooke 1990a (Cooke , 1990b Savage 1989; Urry 1985) . This so-called localities debate has focused on the consequences of de-and reindustrialization on local communities, and, in particular, on local labor markets, housing, and local state planning, and on the role of deeply sedimented community class structures, cultures of work, and gender relations in shaping the rebuilding of place. Locality became the vehicle for wide-ranging discussions about structure and agency, realism and causality, levels of abstraction and the specific way in which locality matters (i.e., what Duncan calls spatial contingency effects, local causal processes, and locality effects [1989:246-247] ). Suffice to say, that localities have a material basis in structures of socio-spatial relations, and via local coalitions, can appear active in their own right (Cox and Mair 1989) . In this sense, localities are always political and struggled over (cf. Massey 1984) , and Cooke (1990a) is right to see locality as a fundamental part of national identity and hence a repository of various rights and memberships that are regularly spoilt and fought over. The proactive nature of localities speaks to several of the articles in this issue that address the questions of how places are made meaningful, and how such meanings are created and contested (see Borneman, this issue).
There is another dimension of locality that takes off from the reality of wider economic, cultural, and political processes being worldwide in scope, and the individual necessarily being enmeshed in global webs in historically unprecedented ways. It is this "critical cosmopolitanism," as Paul Rabinow (1986:258) calls it, that speaks to the lack of fit between the local and the global. Communities Finally, a word on landscape and meaning. Cultural geographers, traditionally concerned with the morphological characteristics of landscapes, have increasingly turned to the symbolic and cultural meanings invested in them, recognizing that "the place is inseparable from the consciousness of those who inhabit it" (Daniels 1985:151) . Landscapes can be explored as "symbolic fields," as "maps of meaning," as "ways of seeing," indeed, read as texts, all of which rests on the presumption that social groups actively produce meanings but do so in ways that can "pinch out emancipatory impulses" (Thrift 1989:151). Cosgrove and Daniels address this multilayered complexity and the dialectical tacking between political economy and representational forms required to unravel the dense meanings encoded in landscapes.
A landscape is a cultural image, a pictorial way of representing, studying or symbolising surroundings. This is not to say that landscapes are immaterial. They may be represented in a variety of materials and on many surfaces-in paint on canvas, in There is much talk of multiple identities, of how identity is labile and sliding. According to Stuart Hall (1989) , identity is a meeting point that constitutes and continually reforms the subject so that he or she can act-points of suture, of temporary identification. As he says, identity is rather like a bus, "You just have to get from here to there, the whole of you can never be represented in the ticket you carry but you have to buy a ticket in order to get from here to there" (1989) . I am not sure how much we know about buying these bus tickets, about how exactly individuals are interpellated by the multiple and often contradictory cultural and symbolic practices rooted in historically constituted, yet increasing global, sites. What are the processes by which a sense of self-construction is shared with others? Why and in what ways are such representations made more or less appealing, and how are they contested (Radway 1990) ?
The same claim might be made about some of the compelling spatial tropes of our time, such as the nation. Balibar (1990:345) rightly points out that nations are reproduced to the extent that a network of practices institutes "a homo nationalis from cradle to grave, at the same time as he/she is instituted as homo economicus, politicus, religiosus. ..." This raises a number of exceedingly complex questions pertaining not only to the multiple identities (in what sense are they compatible or contradictory, the shifting "weights" and gravity of each), but also to the historical conditions that make it possible. In this regard, Borneman's discussion (this issue) of a failure to institute a compelling identity in East Germany is instructive. Under some conditions it is not possible, and, hence, the study of identity "failures" (what might this mean after all?) warrants some attention.
There is strong impulse in many of these discussions that globality in the contemporary epoch generates an extraordinary multiplication of difference, involving fantastic combinations of the old and the new as Walter Benjamin (1973) put it. I want to mention two reservations about the concern with the multiplication of difference and the related idea that the border, the margin, the hybrid, the syncretic "is a more adequate conceptualization of the 'normal' locale of the postmodern subject" (Gupta and Ferguson, this issue). First, it is easy to assume, as do many critics, that difference, plurality, the multiplication of subject positions is a good in itself. It is as though, as Terry Eagleton (1990:87-88) dryly observes, we are stuck with the dreary monism of the National Front and we need a few more fascist parties; or perhaps, there are in fact too few social classes, and we should strive to generate another clutch of aristocracies. Second, the stress on hybrid forms of cultural identity that "do not have to appeal to a pure settled past ... to authenticate themselves" (Bhabha, cited in Asad 1990:472) implies that social identities do not have to be authenticated. There is, in short, a sort of fluidity and continual reinvention out of confused cultural conditions. As Asad (1990:473) properly notes, this is a dangerous position because diverse cultural origins are in no sense a proof that a unity does not exist. Asad is worried by the purported denial of traditions and unified narratives, because "it is a notorious tactic of the dominating power to deny a distinct unity to populations it seeks to manipulate, to assume for itself the status of universal reason while attributing to others a singular contingency" (1990:473) . Some practices of multiculturalism can, therefore, act to reinforce centralized state power. Both of these reservations speak, I think, to a wider concern with unity, and especially to the need to integrate a nonessentialist notion of class; specifically, how identity that rests on difference and splitting can produce a common ground for politics (Hall 1989) .
Finally, I want to return to spatial representations of modernity, and more generally the question of imagination. The general point I wish to make is that most discussions of nationalism, ethnicity, and various forms of identity invoke "the imaginary," but again, I am not at all sure whether it has been adequately problematized. Unlike the work of Althusser or Castoriadis on the social imaginary, imagination and territoriality are employed quite loosely, as though individuals or communities cook up some sort of ideal world out of thin air. There is obviously more to imagination than simply invoking the word and latching it onto an appropriate spatial trope. Fred Jameson (1990:51) , in his study of imperialism and literature, has pointed out that the spatial disjuncture of colonialism has as its immediate consequence "the inability to grasp the way the system functions as a whole," and that national literature and the arts struggle with and engage this "problem of global space," with the imaginary space between colonizer and colonized. In a sense, the inability to grasp the whole is endemic to all periods of space-time compression, of course-for Paris in the mid 19th century as much as for Los Angeles in 1991. I simply want to conclude with one example that explores this question, namely Kristin Ross's (1988) book on Rimbaud and the Paris Commune.
She attempts to identify the common structures of everyday life among French oppositional groups in the 1870s and the condensed fiction of Rimbaud's poetry. What mediates the two is "social space," a series of spatial displacements in France encapsulated in two spatial tropes: first, the projection of Haussmann's fantasy of the straight line reflected in new patterns of geographical integration; and second, the realization of urban space as revolutionary space. For Ross, the Commune was a reaction to the new social space of the Second Empire, and Rimbaud prefigured in his poetry a social space adjacent to that activated by the insurgents, "a creative response to the same objective situation in which the insurrection in Paris was another" (1988:32) . Rimbaud conceived of space as "a specific form of operations and interactions" (1988:35) in a manner analagous to the way in which space and hierarchy came to be "contested in the imagination of the Communards" (1988:4). There is, in short, a homology between the prose poem and the fashioning of the barricades.
Ross's study is a very suggestive analysis of the way in which one can move between, to return to Harvey's spatial grid that I began with, material spatial practices, perceptions, and representations. It requires a geographic sensibility, the interpretive flair of the humanist and literary theorist, and the ethnographic turn of the anthropologist and social historian. This is a tall order, I realize. But how else are we to grasp the "extraordinary crazy quilt" (Soja 1989:245) , "the dazzling . . . patchwork mosaic" (Soja 1989: 245; see also Davis 1990 ) that is the postmodern hyperspace of Los Angeles? Or the unimaginable complexity of the galactic metropolis that is Sao Paulo? Or, for that matter, the shifting, labile identities of Hutu refugees or Shanghai workers? Some tough shit.
Notes

